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PARTNERSHIP-SHARING OF PROFITS-
THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAs HOLDS AN INSURER LIABLE
FOR THE BANKRUPTCY DEBT OF ITS
OBLIGOR BASED ON FINDING OF DE
FACTO PARTNERSHIP WHEN PREMIUMS
ENTITLED THE INSURER To SHARE IN
THE OBLIGOR'S PROFITS
Sarah Moore
N Lain v. ZC Specialty Insurance Co., the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Texas applied Illinois law to hold
that a de facto partnership existed between a debtor and an insurance
company that issued a surety bond to guarantee the debtor's payment of
a mortgage loan.1 The court determined that, because the debtor paid
the insurance company a fixed base premium on the surety bond in addi-
tion to variable "supplemental" premiums that fluctuated with the
amount of remaining cash flow after payment of the debtor's operating
expenses, loan, and note obligations, and because the insurance company
was entitled to either seventy or ninety percent of the debtor's fair mar-
ket value upon its eventual wind up, the parties' relationship went be-
yond that of debtor-creditor. 2 Holding that the parties had formed a de
facto partnership based on its reasoning that the insurer was effectively
receiving a share of the debtor's profits and equity, the court went on to
determine that the insurance company was liable for all the debtor's
bankruptcy debt.3 This holding does not comport with the Illinois Safe
Harbor provision for debtor-creditor relationships,4 does not give effect
to the parties' contractual expectations of limited liability, and may effec-
tively preclude this innovative form of credit-enhanced structured finan-
cial transactions.
1. See generally, Lain v. ZC Specialty Ins. Co., 309 B.R. 223 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
2. See id. at 266.
3. See id.
4. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/7(4)(a), (d) (1978).
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Senior Living Properties, L.L.C. ("SLP") was formed in 1998 for the
acquisition of nursing homes in Illinois and Texas.5 SLP acquired the
homes in a transaction designed with the aid of Complete Care Systems,
L.P. ("CCS"), a nursing home management company that acted to obtain
a mortgage loan from GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corporation
("GMAC") in order to finance the SLP transaction.6 GMAC agreed to
loan SLP $226 million for the purchase of the homes provided that ZC
Specialty Insurance Company ("Zurich"), a Texas property and casualty
insurance company, would agree to issue a surety bond to guarantee pay-
ment of $145 million of the mortgage loan.7 Zurich agreed to provide the
surety bond, GMAC loaned SLP the $226 million to purchase the homes,
and SLP granted a mortgage to secure the GMAC loan.8
The Zurich/SLP transaction essentially allowed SLP to "rent" the fi-
nancial rating of Zurich, who drew on its portfolio to credit-enhance the
SLP mortgage loan.9 In turn, Zurich required SLP to enter into a reim-
bursement agreement, which defined the premiums to be paid by SLP in
consideration for the surety bond and the terms by which SLP agreed to
reimburse Zurich in the event that Zurich made payments to GMAC
under the surety bond. 10 Under the terms of the reimbursement agree-
ment, SLP was required to maintain a liquidity fund to service the
GMAC mortgage loan and the Zurich surety premium, should a net cash
flow shortage exist after payment of operating expenses.11
The distribution of the liquidity fund was to be made pursuant to a
"Waterfall" provision, which dictated that SLP would first apply its
monthly gross receipts toward operating expenses, then toward principal
and interest on the GMAC loan and any other indebtedness to GMAC,
and finally toward the fixed premium reimbursement obligation to Zu-
rich.12 After payment of all operating expenses, loan, and note obliga-
tions, including the fixed surety bond premium, free cash flow would then
be distributed to Zurich in the form of three variable surety premiums: a
"Performance Surety Premium," defined as an amount equal to free cash
flow up to a limit of $4 million, "a Supplemental Performance Surety Pre-
mium," defined as "an amount equal to seventy percent of the remaining
free cash flow," and, upon SLP's "eventual windup," a "Final Supplemen-
tal Performance Surety Premium," described as "the present value of any
unpaid Base Surety Premium and Additional Surety Premium," and "sev-
enty percent of SLP's net fair market value, unless CCS is no longer man-
ager, in which case, means ninety percent. ''13




9. Id. at 236.
10. Id. at 237.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 238-39.
13. Id.
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The Final Supplemental Performance Premium was to be due on "the
earlier of the GMAC note maturity date, payment of GMAC note, or the
date of the disposition of substantially all of SLP's capital assets."
14
However, Zurich could negotiate to extend the GMAC maturity date at
its sole discretion if it concluded that SLP could not pay the Final Supple-
mental Performance Surety Premium in an amount Zurich found satisfac-
tory.15 Additionally, under the terms of the reimbursement agreement,
SLP was required to maintain general liability insurance coverage with
Zurich as a co-insured, to provide Zurich with financial statements, to
allow Zurich to examine its books and records, and to provide Zurich
with at least ten business day's notice of members meetings and the op-
portunity to attend.16 Moreover, SLP could not terminate the CCS man-
agement agreement or choose a new manager absent Zurich's prior
written consent. 17
On May 14, 2002, SLP filed for reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code.' 8 In a resulting adversary proceeding, Dan
Lain, the court-appointed trustee of the SLP Trust, brought suit to de-
clare Zurich liable for all of SLP's debts as a de facto partner.19 Finding
in favor of Lain, the court purported to rely on the "integrated" and "un-
ambiguous terms" of the reimbursement agreement as its sole basis for
determining that, under the Illinois Uniform Partnership Act, Lain had
established by "very clear and convincing evidence" a prima facie show-
ing that the parties intended to enter into a partnership. 20 However, be-
cause the court found that, in light of the circumstances surrounding the
alleged formation of partnership, Zurich had rebutted Lain's prima facie
showing, the court went on to consider extrinsic evidence of the parties'
negotiations, document projections, internal analysis, and the pricing of
the Zurich-SLP transaction.21 Specifically, the court noted the following:
(1) the parties did not execute a partnership agreement; (2) the parties
did not file a declaration or certificate of partnership; (3) there was no
evidence that the parties did business under a partnership name; (4) the
parties did not advertise as partnership; (5) the parties did not create tele-
phone or other listings as a partnership; (6) the parties did not file part-
nership tax returns; (6) the reimbursement agreement does not refer to
SLP and Zurich as partners; (7) the closing documents suggest that SLP
did not have a partner; (8) the GMAC note states that SLP and Zurich
had a debtor-creditor relationship; (9) the parties did have a debtor-credi-
tor relationship; and (10) under the terms of the reimbursement agree-
ment, the surety company is defined as holder of the note, not partner.22
14. Id. at 238.
15. Id. at 237.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Brief for Appellant at 16, Lain (No. 03-3262).
19. Lain, 309 B.R. at 228.
20. Brief for Appellant at 16, Lain (No. 03-3262).




Nevertheless, the court held that the extrinsic evidence offered by Zurich
in rebuttal did not defeat Lain's case, reasoning that a contract to share in
profits remains the essential test.23 Further, despite expert testimony that
substantial involvement in the operations of an obligor is common among
credit-enhanced structured financial transactions, the court noted addi-
tional indicia that it considered evidence of the parties' intent to form a
partnership, 24 including that Zurich contracted to assure that creditors
were paid before excess cash was distributed to equity level interests, had
ultimate control over hiring and termination of SLP management, and
could dictate the priority of payments on expenses and debt obligations. 25
Although the bankruptcy court's holding may reach the equitable re-
sult with which it was concerned by allowing SLP's general unsecured
creditors and personal injury claimants the potential for recovery on their
claims, 26 the holding is nevertheless problematic for several reasons.
First, the court summarily dismisses the Illinois Statutory Safe Harbor
provision for debtor-creditor relationships.27 Second, the court refuses to
give effect to the limited liability relationship that the parties contracted
for and reasonably expected under the terms of the reimbursement
agreement. 28 Finally, the court's holding undermines the potential for
nursing home companies to benefit from participation in financial struc-
turing geared toward back-end payments as opposed to higher, unafford-
able fixed premium payments. 29
Under the Illinois Statutory Safe Harbor provision of the Illinois Uni-
form Partnership Act ("Safe Harbor provision"), no inference of partner-
ship may be drawn where profits are received "[a]s a debt by installments
or otherwise," or "[a]s interest on a loan, though the amount of payment
vary with the profits of a business."'30 Thus, the Safe Harbor provision
clearly provides that, when profits are paid on a loan, profit-sharing "can-
not be proof of partnership as a matter of law."' 31 The bankruptcy court
is quick to dismiss this provision, holding, without further explanation,
that "Zurich did not loan any money to SLP, SLP purchased an insurance
surety bond from Zurich [and] Zurich contracted for the payment of the
premium for that insurance. '32
However, the court overlooks the fact that Zurich did in essence loan
its credit rating to SLP, without which GMAC would not have issued the
23. Id.
24. Id. at 257.
25. See id. at 257-61.
26. See id. at 269 (stating that, as a matter of public policy, "the parties to that agree-
ment should be bound to pay those expenses.").
27. See id. at 255.
28. See Omnitrus Merging Corp. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 628 N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (stating that "[t]he primary objective in contract construction is to give
effect to the intention of the parties ...to be ascertained from the language of the
contract.").
29. See Lain, 309 B.R. at 269.
30. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/7(4)(a), (d) (1978).
31. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1991).
32. Lain, 309 B.R. at 255.
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mortgage loan. Further, the court provides no reasonable basis for distin-
guishing the applicability of the Safe Harbor provision in one instance,
where a loan is issued and payments are received with interest, from the
situation where a surety bond is issued and premiums are paid in consid-
eration for the bond. 33 Moreover, it is well-settled that profits, when re-
ceived in repayment of debt, do not evidence that there was a
partnership. 34 Under the terms of the reimbursement agreement, SLP
owed a debt to Zurich for which the Performance Premiums and Supple-
mental Performance Premiums were paid in consideration.35 Thus, under
the Safe Harbor provision of the Illinois Uniform Partnership Act,
whether viewed as interest on a loan or payments on a debt, the Perform-
ance Premiums and Supplemental Performance Premiums paid by SLP to
Zurich in consideration for the surety bond did not constitute prima facie
evidence of a partnership. 36
Furthermore, the "unambiguous" terms of the reimbursement agree-
ment clearly establish that SLP and Zurich intended to create a debtor-
creditor relationship, which has been held to be the controlling considera-
tion in the absence of a partnership agreement. 37 In fact, the reimburse-
ment agreement contains a provision that binds SLP to comply with the
terms of its operating agreement, which provides in "Article I, Organiza-
tion, Section 1.6, No Partnership:" "[t]he members intend that the Com-
pany not be a partnership (including, but without limitation, a limited
partnership) or joint venture, and that no Member be a partner or joint
venturer of any other Member." 38 Moreover, the court's finding that the
parties intended to create a partnership is particularly problematic in
light of the fact that, "where the evidence contains writings of the parties
that distinctly indicate a relationship other than a partnership, the asser-
tion that a partnership exists must be based on very clear and convincing
evidence," and, as discussed above, profit-sharing is not sufficient evi-
dence of a partnership. 39 Moreover, when a surety bond is at issue, an
increasingly heightened burden of proof is placed on the party asserting
partnership, namely that the agreement must be "strictly construed and
may not be extended by implication or imposed beyond the express terms
of the instrument. ' 40 Rather than apply the plain language of the reim-
bursement agreement to give effect to the parties' intent, as the bank-
33. See generally id.
34. See, e.g., Wash. Comm. Group v. Henry, 18 B.R. 437, 444 (D.D.C. 1982) (finding
that a debtor and lender did not create partnership when the lender was entitled to receive
forty percent of debtor's profits in return for line of credit).
35. See Lain, 309 B.R. at 238.
36. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/7(4) (1978).
37. See Lain, 309 B.R. at 256; Seidmon v. Harris, 526 N.E.2d 543, 546 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988) (finding that absent a partnership agreement, the controlling consideration under
Illinois law and the Uniform Partnership Act is the intent of the parties to agree to form a
partnership).
38. Brief for Appellant at 16, Lain (No. 03-3262).
39. Seidmon, 526 N.E.2d at 546.




ruptcy court recognizes it should,41 the court's holding instead transforms
the debtor-creditor relationship for which SLP and Zurich contracted
into the unlimited liability of a general partnership. 42
While the bankruptcy court purports to give effect to the parties' intent
as evidenced in the reimbursement agreement, it proceeds to consider the
circumstances surrounding the alleged partnership between Zurich and
SLP.43 Such additional circumstances indicating a partnership include
"the manner in which the parties have dealt with each other; the mode in
which each has, with the knowledge of the other, dealt with persons in a
partnership capacity; [and] whether [the parties] have filed with the
county clerk a certificate setting forth the name of the partnership."' 44 As
the court notes, none of these conditions were present in the SLP-Zurich
transaction. Instead, the court's finding that the reimbursement agree-
ment created a partnership is based solely on its view that the Perform-
ance Premiums and Supplemental Performance Premiums support the
inference of a partnership. 45 As noted above, under the application of
the Safe Harbor provision, that partnership presumption does not apply.
Finally, the court's holding may effectively preclude nursing home
companies from participating in this innovative form of credit-enhanced
structured financial transaction. Because the Zurich-SLP transaction
model allows for the payment of back-end premiums in place of higher,
unaffordable fixed premium payments, nursing homes can more easily
enter the marketplace. However, as the bankruptcy court itself notes as a
matter of public policy, "providing nursing home facilities absent a pri-
vate market would be a government function. '46 The court's holding
may effectively deter the marketplace from providing this form of back-
end premium driven credit-enhanced financing for nursing home opera-
tions that cannot afford the fixed premium alternative.47 While the argu-
ment over the merits of a privatized versus a government-supported
public health care system remains ongoing, any particular result is cer-
tainly not for the judiciary to compel through the misapplication of law.
The bankruptcy court's holding that SLP and Zurich formed a de facto
partnership and that Zurich is thus liable for all of SLP's bankruptcy debt
is, at best, an erroneous application of the Illinois Uniform Partnership
Act and a failure to give effect to the plain language of the reimburse-
ment agreement. 48 The court's reasoning that, under the terms of the
parties' agreement, Zurich was effectively receiving a share of SLP profits
and equity, and thus formed a de facto partnership with SLP, fails to con-
41. See Lain, 309 B.R. at 239.
42. See id. at 268-69.
43. See id. at 234 (citing Seidmon, 526 N.E.2d at 545-46 for the proposition that "[als
between the parties, the existence of a partnership is a question of intent, based on all of
the facts and circumstances.").
44. See id. (citing Snyder v. Dunn, 638 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)).
45. Id. at 239-42.
46. See id. at 269.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 266.
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sider the natural application of the Illinois Safe Harbor provision for
debtor-creditor relationships. 49 Under this provision, the inference of a
partnership based on profit-sharing does not apply. 50 Moreover, under
the plain language of the reimbursement agreement, Zurich and SLP
clearly established a debtor-creditor relationship, even going so far as to
expressly state that no partnership relationship was to exist.51 The court's
finding of de facto partnership runs directly contrary to the parties' ex-
pressed intent, held to be the controlling consideration of a finding of
partnership in the absence of a partnership agreement. 52 On appeal, the
bankruptcy court's holding should be reversed in light of the Safe Harbor
provision of the Illinois Uniform Partnership Act, thereby giving effect to
the contractual expectations of limited liability for which SLP and Zurich
actually bargained and reassuring the marketplace that it may continue to
provide nursing homes with this innovative form of credit-enhanced
structured financial transaction.
49. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/7(4) (1978).
50. See id.
51. Brief for Appellant at 16, Lain (No. 03-3262).
52. See Lain, 309 B.R. at 239.
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